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OLL Chron

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington D C 20505

26 October 1984

The Honorable James A. Baker, III Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:

Enclosed is the material I talked to you about last night.

Sincerely,

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

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D/OLL:CABriggs; jms (25 Oct 84)

## TALKING POINTS

- -- With FDN fighters going into Nicaragua, its political section was charged with developing a code of conduct and training to prepare their men to deal with people in villages they might enter in a manner consistent with FDN objectives.
- -- A code of conduct for FDN fighters was prepared and printed in pocket size so that each FDN fighter could carry it on his person.
- -- It explained that the objective of the FDN is to develop a democratic and pluralistic government in Nicaragua. It calls for a reconciliation of the Nicaraguan family, the establishment of social justice and human rights, the restoration of freedoms violated by the Sandinistas, economic reform and greater social mobility.
- -- Courses were given for men selected to serve as political and psychological operations officers when, in the conduct of military operations, towns or villages in Nicaragua were visited or occupied.
- -- The FDN wanted the lesson plans and lectures converted into a handbook to be sent into Nicaragua for political guidance to men already there. The manual, entitled Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, was prepared and 2,000 copies were printed in Honduras for distribution by the FDN.
- -- All this was done in the political section of the FDN command by FDN officers with the assistance of an advisor provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.
- -- The manual was prepared by and addressed to people who had made the fateful decision to engage in armed combat in order to resist oppression by a totalitarian regime.
- -- The manual states that its purpose is to assure that every combatant will be "highly motivated to engage in propaganda face to face, to the same degree that he is motivated to fight." The "individual political awareness, the reason for his struggle, must be as acute as his capacity to fight."
- -- It aims to make every FDN guerrilla "persuasive in face to face communication--a propagandist-combatant--in his contact with the people; he must be capable of giving 5 or 10 logical reasons why, for example, a peasant must give him fabric, needle and thread to mend his clothes. When the guerrilla behaves this way, enemy propaganda will never turn him into an enemy in the eyes of the population."
- -- It goes on to deal with developing political awareness, using group dynamics, interaction with the people, "live, eat and work with the people," respect for human rights, teaching and civic action.
- -- There is advice on the problems of any fighting force in handling local opposition when it visits or occupies a community. It says "enemies of the people, the Sandinista officials or agents, must not be mistreated in spite of their criminal actions even though the guerrilla forces may have suffered casualties." It tells how to protect both guerrillas and citizens when a town is occupied.

- -- There is advice for armed propaganda teams charged with raising political consciousness within Nicaragua and personal persuasion within the population. Emphasis is on education, avoiding combat if possible, "not turning the town into a battlefield."
- -- There are four brief passages in a 90-page document with which the whole document and the FDN psychological operations have been characterized. Out of these, two passages were deleted by the FDN.

## -- A third states:

"If a guerrilla shoots an individual, make the population see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized their primordial duty, which is protecting the citizens." This is followed by:

"The commando tried to stop the informant without shooting, because he, like all Christian guerrillas, advocate non-violence. Having shot the Sandinista informer, although it is against his own will, was necessary to avoid repression on the part of the Sandinista government against the innocent people."

## -- The fourth states:

"We could neutralize carefully selected and planned for targets, such as court judges, cattle judges (jueces de mesta), police or state security officers, CDS chiefs, etc." The lecture notes from which the document was prepared used "remove" rather than "neutralize." In the translation into Spanish "remove" became "neutralize." The American Heritage Dictionary defines neutralize as "to make ineffective; counterbalance and bring to nothing." Converting this language into violation of the President's Executive Order is an outrageous distortion. The words "assassination" or "murder" with which the document has been labeled appear nowhere in the document.

- -- The two passages above are in the context of entering or occupying a community and dealing with a situation in which actual or potential resistance remains. They are preceded by these admonitions:
  - The "enemies of the people, the Sandinista officials or agencies, must not be mistreated in spite of the criminal actions even though the guerrilla forces may have suffered casualties."
  - "Whenever it is necessary to use armed force during an occupation or a visit to a town or a village," the guerrillas are to "explain to the population that first of all this is being done to protect them, the people not the querrillas themselves."
  - "This action, while not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society where acts of force are not necessary."

